fix(security): require proof that x-9r-real-ip came from the socket (GHSA-pjm4-8fpg-f9p6)

x-9r-real-ip and the Host fallback were trusted from client-controlled
headers whenever custom-server.js was not in the request path (npm run
start, start:bun), letting a remote caller pose as local to skip API key
auth and reach LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS (/api/mcp/*, /api/tunnel/enable,
/api/auth/reset-password).

custom-server.js now generates a per-process secret at boot and stamps it
as x-9r-peer-token on every request it sanitizes. hasTrustedPeerHeaders()
(src/lib/auth/trustedPeer.js) gates trust in x-9r-real-ip on that secret;
otherwise the guard falls back to Host only in development, and fails
closed in production. Same gate on loginLimiter.getClientIp() so a spoofed
header cannot rotate the login lockout bucket.

Also: fix isLoopbackHostname for IPv6 (::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) which the
old split(":")[0] reduced to empty string; route npm run start /
start:bun through custom-server.js (postbuild copies it into
.next/standalone, build-cli.js fails without it) so documented deployments
keep passwordless local access.
This commit is contained in:
Nguyen Thanh Dat
2026-08-14 16:32:40 +07:00
committed by decolua
parent b04c03c6b5
commit 92259214db
12 changed files with 403 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
// custom-server.js is the only thing that makes x-9r-real-ip trustworthy. Boot a real
// HTTP server through it and confirm a client cannot smuggle its own peer headers in.
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from "vitest";
import { createRequire } from "node:module";
import http from "node:http";
import { __test__ as requestDetails } from "@/lib/db/repos/requestDetailsRepo.js";
const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
let server;
let baseUrl;
let seenHeaders;
beforeAll(async () => {
require("../../custom-server.js");
server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
seenHeaders = req.headers;
res.end("ok");
});
await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));
});
async function get(headers = {}) {
await fetch(baseUrl, { headers });
return seenHeaders;
}
describe("custom-server peer header sanitizing", () => {
it("generates a peer trust token at boot", () => {
expect(process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{48}$/);
});
it("replaces a client-supplied x-9r-real-ip with the socket address", async () => {
const headers = await get({ "x-9r-real-ip": "203.0.113.55" });
expect(headers["x-9r-real-ip"]).toMatch(/^(::ffff:)?127\.0\.0\.1$/);
});
it("stamps the trust token so downstream can tell the wrapper ran", async () => {
const headers = await get();
expect(headers["x-9r-peer-token"]).toBe(process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN);
});
it("drops a client-supplied peer trust token", async () => {
const headers = await get({ "x-9r-peer-token": "forged-token" });
expect(headers["x-9r-peer-token"]).toBe(process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN);
expect(headers["x-9r-peer-token"]).not.toBe("forged-token");
});
it("drops a client-supplied x-9r-via-proxy marker", async () => {
const headers = await get({ "x-9r-via-proxy": "1" });
expect(headers["x-9r-via-proxy"]).toBeUndefined();
});
it("marks via-proxy and adopts the forwarded IP for a loopback proxy hop", async () => {
const headers = await get({ "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9, 10.0.0.1" });
expect(headers["x-9r-via-proxy"]).toBe("1");
expect(headers["x-9r-real-ip"]).toBe("203.0.113.9");
expect(headers["x-forwarded-for"]).toBeUndefined();
});
// chat.js snapshots every client header into the request detail. Anything that grants
// access must not survive into a record the dashboard renders and cloud sync uploads.
it("keeps the peer token out of persisted request details", () => {
const sanitized = requestDetails.sanitizeHeaders({
"x-9r-peer-token": "secret",
"x-9r-cli-token": "secret",
"authorization": "Bearer sk-x",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
});
expect(sanitized["x-9r-peer-token"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(sanitized["x-9r-cli-token"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(sanitized["authorization"]).toBeUndefined();
expect(sanitized["x-9r-real-ip"]).toBe("127.0.0.1");
});
});

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/auth/dashboardSession", () => ({
const { proxy, __test__ } = await import("../../src/dashboardGuard.js");
const PEER_TOKEN = "peer-token-fixture";
function request(pathname, headers = {}) {
const normalizedHeaders = new Headers(headers);
return {
@@ -45,9 +47,16 @@ function request(pathname, headers = {}) {
};
}
// A request that actually came through custom-server.js: peer IP stamped from the TCP
// socket and proven by the per-process secret.
function localRequest(pathname, headers = {}) {
return request(pathname, { "x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN, "x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1", ...headers });
}
describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: true });
mocks.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue(false);
mocks.getConsistentMachineId.mockResolvedValue("cli-token");
@@ -55,14 +64,14 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback public LLM API without API key", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
expect(mocks.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects remote Host-spoof when real peer IP is non-loopback", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", {
host: "localhost",
"x-9r-real-ip": "10.204.111.34",
}));
@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback peer IP regardless of Host", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
}));
@@ -89,7 +98,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback rewritten public LLM API without API key", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
expect(mocks.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
@@ -191,6 +200,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: true });
mocks.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue(false);
mocks.getConsistentMachineId.mockResolvedValue("cli-token");
@@ -207,7 +217,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
});
it("rejects local-only route on loopback when requireLogin=true and no JWT", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/mcp/filesystem/sse", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/mcp/filesystem/sse", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://localhost:20128",
}));
@@ -219,7 +229,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
it("allows local-only route on loopback when requireLogin=false", async () => {
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: false });
const response = await proxy(request("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://localhost:20128",
}));
@@ -240,7 +250,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
it("rejects local-only route when Origin is non-loopback (CSRF block)", async () => {
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: false });
const response = await proxy(request("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://evil.example.com",
}));

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
// GHSA-pjm4-8fpg-f9p6 (#3294): `next start` leaves custom-server.js out of the request
// path, so x-9r-real-ip arrives straight from the client and a remote caller can claim to
// be loopback. Host is spoofable the same way, so it cannot be the production fallback.
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
nextResponse: Symbol("next"),
jsonResponse: vi.fn((body, init) => ({ status: init?.status || 200, body })),
getSettings: vi.fn(),
validateApiKey: vi.fn(),
getConsistentMachineId: vi.fn(),
verifyDashboardAuthToken: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock("next/server", () => ({
NextResponse: {
next: vi.fn(() => mocks.nextResponse),
json: mocks.jsonResponse,
redirect: vi.fn((url) => ({ status: 307, url })),
},
}));
vi.mock("@/lib/localDb", () => ({
getSettings: mocks.getSettings,
validateApiKey: mocks.validateApiKey,
}));
vi.mock("@/shared/utils/machineId", () => ({
getConsistentMachineId: mocks.getConsistentMachineId,
}));
vi.mock("@/lib/auth/dashboardSession", () => ({
verifyDashboardAuthToken: mocks.verifyDashboardAuthToken,
}));
const { proxy } = await import("../../src/dashboardGuard.js");
const { getClientIp } = await import("../../src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.js");
const PEER_TOKEN = "peer-token-fixture";
function request(pathname, headers = {}) {
return {
nextUrl: { pathname, searchParams: new URL(`http://localhost${pathname}`).searchParams },
headers: new Headers(headers),
cookies: { get: vi.fn(() => undefined) },
url: `http://localhost${pathname}`,
};
}
const originalNodeEnv = process.env.NODE_ENV;
describe("peer header trust", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
process.env.NODE_ENV = "production";
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: true });
mocks.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue(false);
mocks.getConsistentMachineId.mockResolvedValue("cli-token");
mocks.verifyDashboardAuthToken.mockResolvedValue(false);
});
afterEach(() => {
process.env.NODE_ENV = originalNodeEnv;
delete process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN;
});
it("rejects a spoofed loopback peer IP that carries no trust proof", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "172.18.192.1:20140",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
expect(response.body.error).toBe("API key required for remote API access");
});
it("rejects a spoofed loopback peer IP carrying a wrong trust token", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "172.18.192.1:20140",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
"x-9r-peer-token": "guessed-token",
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
});
it("rejects a spoofed loopback Host in production", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", { host: "localhost" }));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
});
it("rejects a spoofed loopback peer IP when the wrapper never booted", async () => {
delete process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN;
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "172.18.192.1:20140",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
"x-9r-peer-token": "any-token",
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
});
it("keeps serving a genuinely local request stamped by the wrapper", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
"x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN,
}));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
expect(mocks.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// A dual-stack listener reports loopback as ::ffff:127.0.0.1, which the old
// split-on-first-colon check reduced to "".
it.each(["::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::1", "[::1]", "127.0.0.1", "::FFFF:127.0.0.1"])(
"treats %s as a loopback peer",
async (peerIp) => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": peerIp,
"x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN,
}));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
}
);
it.each(["::ffff:10.204.111.34", "2001:db8::1", "[2001:db8::1]", "10.204.111.34"])(
"refuses %s as a peer",
async (peerIp) => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": peerIp,
"x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN,
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
}
);
it("still refuses a stamped non-loopback peer IP", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": "10.204.111.34",
"x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN,
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(401);
});
it("blocks spoofed local-only routes that would otherwise spawn processes", async () => {
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: false });
const response = await proxy(request("/api/mcp/filesystem/sse", {
host: "172.18.192.1:20140",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
}));
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
expect(response.body.error).toBe("Local only: CLI token required");
});
it("accepts the legacy Host fallback only in development", async () => {
process.env.NODE_ENV = "development";
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/models", { host: "localhost:20127" }));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
});
});
describe("login limiter client IP", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
delete process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
});
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN;
delete process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
});
it("buckets spoofed peer IPs together so lockout cannot be rotated away", () => {
const first = getClientIp(request("/api/auth/login", { "x-9r-real-ip": "1.1.1.1" }));
const second = getClientIp(request("/api/auth/login", { "x-9r-real-ip": "2.2.2.2" }));
expect(first).toBe("unknown");
expect(second).toBe("unknown");
});
it("keys on the stamped peer IP when the wrapper proved it", () => {
const ip = getClientIp(request("/api/auth/login", {
"x-9r-real-ip": "203.0.113.9",
"x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN,
}));
expect(ip).toBe("203.0.113.9");
});
it("still honours TRUST_PROXY for operators fronting 9router with a reverse proxy", () => {
process.env.TRUST_PROXY = "true";
const ip = getClientIp(request("/api/auth/login", { "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.7, 10.0.0.1" }));
expect(ip).toBe("198.51.100.7");
});
});

View File

@@ -37,6 +37,17 @@ describe("standalone build assets", () => {
.toBe("static asset");
});
// Without the wrapper beside server.js nothing can prove a request is local.
it("copies the request-sanitizing server wrapper into the standalone output", () => {
const projectRoot = createBuildFixture(".next");
writeFileSync(join(projectRoot, "custom-server.js"), "wrapper");
copyStandaloneAssets({ projectRoot, distDir: ".next" });
expect(readFileSync(join(projectRoot, ".next", "standalone", "custom-server.js"), "utf8"))
.toBe("wrapper");
});
it("does not modify workspace-traced CLI builds", () => {
const projectRoot = createBuildFixture(".next-cli-build");
const previousMode = process.env.NEXT_TRACING_ROOT_MODE;