fix(security): require proof that x-9r-real-ip came from the socket (GHSA-pjm4-8fpg-f9p6)

x-9r-real-ip and the Host fallback were trusted from client-controlled
headers whenever custom-server.js was not in the request path (npm run
start, start:bun), letting a remote caller pose as local to skip API key
auth and reach LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS (/api/mcp/*, /api/tunnel/enable,
/api/auth/reset-password).

custom-server.js now generates a per-process secret at boot and stamps it
as x-9r-peer-token on every request it sanitizes. hasTrustedPeerHeaders()
(src/lib/auth/trustedPeer.js) gates trust in x-9r-real-ip on that secret;
otherwise the guard falls back to Host only in development, and fails
closed in production. Same gate on loginLimiter.getClientIp() so a spoofed
header cannot rotate the login lockout bucket.

Also: fix isLoopbackHostname for IPv6 (::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) which the
old split(":")[0] reduced to empty string; route npm run start /
start:bun through custom-server.js (postbuild copies it into
.next/standalone, build-cli.js fails without it) so documented deployments
keep passwordless local access.
This commit is contained in:
Nguyen Thanh Dat
2026-08-14 16:32:40 +07:00
committed by decolua
parent b04c03c6b5
commit 92259214db
12 changed files with 403 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/auth/dashboardSession", () => ({
const { proxy, __test__ } = await import("../../src/dashboardGuard.js");
const PEER_TOKEN = "peer-token-fixture";
function request(pathname, headers = {}) {
const normalizedHeaders = new Headers(headers);
return {
@@ -45,9 +47,16 @@ function request(pathname, headers = {}) {
};
}
// A request that actually came through custom-server.js: peer IP stamped from the TCP
// socket and proven by the per-process secret.
function localRequest(pathname, headers = {}) {
return request(pathname, { "x-9r-peer-token": PEER_TOKEN, "x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1", ...headers });
}
describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: true });
mocks.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue(false);
mocks.getConsistentMachineId.mockResolvedValue("cli-token");
@@ -55,14 +64,14 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback public LLM API without API key", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
expect(mocks.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects remote Host-spoof when real peer IP is non-loopback", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", {
host: "localhost",
"x-9r-real-ip": "10.204.111.34",
}));
@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback peer IP regardless of Host", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/v1/chat/completions", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/v1/chat/completions", {
host: "localhost:20128",
"x-9r-real-ip": "127.0.0.1",
}));
@@ -89,7 +98,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
});
it("allows loopback rewritten public LLM API without API key", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/v1/chat/completions", { host: "localhost:20128" }));
expect(response).toBe(mocks.nextResponse);
expect(mocks.validateApiKey).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
@@ -191,6 +200,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard public LLM API access", () => {
describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
process.env.NINEROUTER_PEER_TOKEN = PEER_TOKEN;
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: true });
mocks.validateApiKey.mockResolvedValue(false);
mocks.getConsistentMachineId.mockResolvedValue("cli-token");
@@ -207,7 +217,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
});
it("rejects local-only route on loopback when requireLogin=true and no JWT", async () => {
const response = await proxy(request("/api/mcp/filesystem/sse", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/mcp/filesystem/sse", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://localhost:20128",
}));
@@ -219,7 +229,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
it("allows local-only route on loopback when requireLogin=false", async () => {
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: false });
const response = await proxy(request("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://localhost:20128",
}));
@@ -240,7 +250,7 @@ describe("dashboard guard local-only access", () => {
it("rejects local-only route when Origin is non-loopback (CSRF block)", async () => {
mocks.getSettings.mockResolvedValue({ requireLogin: false });
const response = await proxy(request("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
const response = await proxy(localRequest("/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm", {
host: "localhost:20128",
origin: "http://evil.example.com",
}));