f260a1817b
Ollama: replace informational stub with real quota tracker hitting ollama.com/api/usage (session 5h + weekly 7d, 0..1 ratio) and /api/me plan label; bind handler to apiKey + add features.usageApikey so apikey connections work.
Token refresh: add backgroundTokenRefresh scheduler that refreshes OAuth connections within max(provider lead, 30min) of expiry, independent of inbound traffic (10s after boot, then every 5min, unref'd timers, DISABLE_BACKGROUND_TOKEN_REFRESH kill-switch, fail-open per tick/connection). Registered from custom-server.js (listening) and initializeApp.js. checkAndRefreshToken gains opt-in {force} for the scheduler; request path unchanged.
72 lines
2.8 KiB
JavaScript
72 lines
2.8 KiB
JavaScript
const http = require("http");
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const path = require("path");
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const { pathToFileURL } = require("url");
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const origCreate = http.createServer.bind(http);
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let backgroundRefreshStarted = false;
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function startBackgroundTokenRefreshFromCustomServer() {
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if (backgroundRefreshStarted) return;
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backgroundRefreshStarted = true;
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// Prefer source path (repo / standalone that still has src). Fail-open if missing
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// — initializeApp also starts the same scheduler when the Next app boots.
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const modPath = path.join(__dirname, "src", "sse", "services", "backgroundTokenRefresh.js");
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import(pathToFileURL(modPath).href)
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.then((m) => {
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try {
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m.startBackgroundTokenRefresh();
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} catch (e) {
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console.error("[BackgroundTokenRefresh] start failed:", e && e.message ? e.message : e);
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}
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const stop = () => {
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try {
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m.stopBackgroundTokenRefresh();
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} catch {
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/* ignore */
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}
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};
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process.once("SIGINT", stop);
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process.once("SIGTERM", stop);
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})
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.catch((e) => {
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// Expected in published CLI standalone (src/ not on disk). App bootstrap covers it.
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if (process.env.DEBUG_BACKGROUND_TOKEN_REFRESH) {
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console.error("[BackgroundTokenRefresh] import failed:", e && e.message ? e.message : e);
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}
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});
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}
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// Wrap Next standalone HTTP server: derive client IP from the TCP socket
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// (unspoofable) and strip client-supplied forwarding headers so downstream
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// rate-limiting keys on the real peer address instead of attacker-controlled XFF.
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http.createServer = (...args) => {
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const handler = args.find((a) => typeof a === "function");
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const rest = args.filter((a) => typeof a !== "function");
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if (!handler) return origCreate(...args);
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const wrapped = (req, res) => {
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const socketIp = req.socket && req.socket.remoteAddress ? req.socket.remoteAddress : "";
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const xff = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"];
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const xRealIp = req.headers["x-real-ip"];
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const viaProxy = !!(xff || xRealIp);
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const isLoopbackProxy = socketIp === "127.0.0.1" || socketIp === "::1" || socketIp === "::ffff:127.0.0.1";
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// Trust forwarding headers only when the TCP peer is a local reverse proxy.
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// Direct/public sockets remain keyed by the unspoofable peer address.
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const proxyIp = xRealIp || (xff ? String(xff).split(",")[0].trim() : "");
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const ip = isLoopbackProxy && proxyIp ? proxyIp : socketIp;
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delete req.headers["x-9r-real-ip"];
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delete req.headers["x-forwarded-for"];
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delete req.headers["x-9r-via-proxy"];
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req.headers["x-9r-real-ip"] = ip;
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if (viaProxy) req.headers["x-9r-via-proxy"] = "1";
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return handler(req, res);
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};
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const server = origCreate(...rest, wrapped);
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server.once("listening", () => {
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startBackgroundTokenRefreshFromCustomServer();
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});
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return server;
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};
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require("./server.js");
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